On September 24 Emmanuel Macron said France would withdraw its ambassador from Niger and remove all its troops (thought to be around 1,500) by the end of the year, ending all military cooperation.
So what? A seismic power shift is underway in the Sahara. In the face of coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, Paris is
Have your yellow cake and eat it. The retreat raises an important question – where will France (and by extension the EU) source the uranium used in its nuclear plants?
When Niger’s President Bazoum, a Western ally, was ousted in a coup in July, Sahelian social media was awash with fake news and exaggerations about how France mines Niger’s uranium (many accounts were probably linked to Russian or Wagner bot farms).
Astute observers will remember the country was at the centre of a scandal in the early 2000s about whether Iraq’s Saddam Hussein tried to buy yellowcake uranium powder to develop weapons of mass destruction (a 2006 US intelligence report found it was “unlikely”).
Francafrique. France’s energy giant Orano (formerly Areva; majority owned by the French state) has dominated Niger’s mines deep in the Sahara Desert for five decades.
This makes uranium supplies as important as oil for French strategic planners.
Paris has not shied away from intervening to protect its supplies in Niger – in 2013, the French defence minister reportedly ordered special forces to protect the two sites around Arlit against potential jihadist attacks.
Do a French exit. With the French military due to leave Niger by the end of the year, it is unclear whether the Orano will stay around for long. It’s hard to see how its position will remain tenable amid the rampant anti-French sentiment on the street and in government.
But this isn’t the catastrophe for France it once might have been. It has diversified; France imported about 20 per cent of its uranium from Niger in 2022, compared to 37 per cent from Kazakhstan, 13 per cent from Uzbekistan and 16 per cent from Namibia.
Good relations with the Central Asian countries will probably become an even more important part of French and EU foreign policy going forward. The pivot is well underway. Last year, Macron held a rare summit at the Elysée Palace for the Uzbek and the Kazakh presidents.
Resource curse cont. As for Niger, China is its second largest foreign investor after France. Russia, which is cultivating ties with the new juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and has interests in uranium mining, could also jump in on the action.
Either way, it’s unlikely that ordinary Nigeriens will see much change. This is another chapter in Africa’s resource-curse saga.