The blowout of an aircraft door plug at 16,000 feet is a nervous flyer’s nightmare. It’s also the cause of sleepless nights for Boeing’s board as it deals with the aftermath of the incident that forced an emergency landing by an Alaska Airlines 737 Max 9 last Friday.
Boeing’s stock has fallen more than 8 per cent in the week since, and angry shareholders are calling for CEO David Calhoun to resign.
So what? A scalping won’t solve Boeing’s deep-rooted quality control problems. Nor will it
- narrow the company’s growing production gap with European rival Airbus,
- fill its pipeline with engineering talent, or
- shrink its $39 billion debt pile.
Calhoun, the former chair who’s been CEO since 2020, acted quickly to minimise reputational damage, admitting there had been a “quality escape” – jargon for mistake – and pledging “100 per cent transparency” in front of employees.
Since the Max 8 crashes in 2018 and 2019 that killed nearly 350 people and led to the Max’s worldwide grounding for 20 months (more on this below), Boeing has learnt a few lessons – mostly about how to fess up.
But words alone can’t fix the problems landing in Boeing’s backyard like a faulty pieces of fuselage:
Structure. Door plugs for the three-month old 737 Max 9 were made and installed by Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, spun off from Boeing in 2005. But passing the buck to Spirit won’t fly. This is Spirit’s third production glitch this year; the others involved fittings and some improperly drilled holes on a Max 8. All point to failures of oversight. Bringing production back in-house is one remedy, but a more likely outcome, according to Graham Simons, author of Boeing 737: the World’s Most Controversial Jetliner, is a further fracturing of the Boeing empire, as it contemplates ring-fencing its space and loss-making defence businesses.
Resources. Due to the poor state of its balance sheet, Boeing has held back from developing new aircraft to compete with Airbus’s long-range A321. Now it could get hit with an additional £2.3 billion shortfall if shipments of 70 new Max 9s are put on hold. Since Covid, encouraging furloughed engineers back into work has been an additional headache.
Culture. Ever since Boeing bought the failing aircraft manufacturer McDonnell-Douglas over 25 years ago, it has faced accusations of prioritising profits over quality assurance. Past initiatives put pressure on suppliers to cut costs, while critics say there is a disconnect between financially-driven executives and the company’s engineer-heavy workforce. A WSJ investigation found that Calhoun’s visits to Boeing’s manufacturing hub in Washington state have been infrequent since he took over; he’s said to prefer working from home in New Hampshire.
History. The Max 9 is a third longer and twice as heavy as the original 737, which first flew in 1967. Many of the technical problems that have plagued later models – and Simons says there are nearly 20 known to Boeing that have not been widely publicised – stem from cost-driven decisions to stretch the plane and boost its engine power rather than design a new one from the ground up. “It’s always cheaper to modify than go brand new,” he says.
- The original 737-100 was highly profitable because its short landing gear and low clearance allowed quick turnarounds with no need for jetways or luggage conveyors.
- But as the fuselage was stretched it needed bigger engines which had to be mounted forward of the wings and tilted upward to avoid costly recertification. That required a software patch to stabilise the aircraft, which led indirectly to the 2018 and ‘19 crashes.
- Lengthening the body also required the mid-cabin door option, and the plug when not in use.
False economies. For Boeing’s first 54 years, Airbus didn’t even exist. In 2023 it delivered 162 more planes and made $6 billion in profits to Boeing’s $2 billion loss.
